IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ratsoc/v3y1991i4p423-436.html

Functionality, Rent Seeking, and Government as Determinants of Inequality

Author

Listed:
  • ERICH WEEDE

    (University of Cologne, Germany)

Abstract

Societies benefit from unequal rewards and some system of social stratification, if extraordinary rewards provide signals where more effort is required or where scare talents should go. But these signals cannot avoid some ambiguity. By advertising the availability of extraordinary rewards, it is also advertised that restrictive practices, in particular barriers to entry, are likely to succeed in distorting prices. Inevitably, functional inequality generates dysfunctional inequality. Inevitably, rational actors try to escape from competition and to capture rents. Although the democratic political process should neutralize attempts to escape from competition, it is more likely to reinforce them. Politics is not part of the cure for rent seeking but part of the problem itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Erich Weede, 1991. "Functionality, Rent Seeking, and Government as Determinants of Inequality," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(4), pages 423-436, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:423-436
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463191003004003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1043463191003004003
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1043463191003004003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Bernholz, 1977. "Dominant Interest Groups And Powerless Parties," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 411-420, August.
    2. World Bank, 1983. "World Development Report 1983," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 5966, April.
    3. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Erich Weede, 1990. "Ideas, Institutions and Political Culture in Western Development," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 369-389, October.
    2. Erich Weede, 1986. "Rent Seeking, Military Participation, and Economic Performance in LDCs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(2), pages 291-314, June.
    3. Bruno S. Frey & Paolo Pamini & Lasse Steiner, 2011. "What Determines The World Heritage List? An Econometric Analysis," CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-01, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    4. Mikael Priks, 2005. "Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default Risk and Monitoring Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 1464, CESifo.
    5. David C. E. Chew, 1993. "Civil Service Pay in the Asian‐Pacific Region," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 7(1), pages 28-52, May.
    6. Aysit Tansel & Ceyhan Ozturk & Erkan Erdil, 2021. "The Impact of Body Mass Index on Growth, Schooling, Productivity, and Savings: A Cross-Country Study," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 2118, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    7. Wolfgang Maennig, 2004. "Korruption im internationalen Sport: ökonomische Analyse und Lösungsansätze," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 263-291.
    8. Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart, 2010. "The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-27, March.
    9. John R. Boyce & David M. Bruner, 2009. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: Endogenous Property Rights in a Game of Conflict," Working Papers 09-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    10. John Burnett & Chris Paul & Allen Wilhite, 1997. "Political Campaigns as Rent-Seeking Games: Take the Money and Run," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(5), pages 509-521, September.
    11. Eduardo Zambrano, 1999. "Formal Models Of Authority," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(2), pages 115-138, May.
    12. John Boatright, 2009. "Rent Seeking in a Market with Morality: Solving a Puzzle About Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 88(4), pages 541-552, October.
    13. Social Policy and Population Section, Social Development Division, ESCAP., 1995. "Asia-Pacific Population Journal Volume 10, No. 4," Asia-Pacific Population Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 10(4), pages 1-41, November.
    14. Enrico Colombatto, 2000. "An Explanation of the Dynamics of Protectionism," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 279-293, July.
    15. Ansu Datta, 2002. "Africa and Globalization," Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, , vol. 6(1), pages 45-59, June.
    16. Ashok Chakravarti, 2012. "Institutions, Economic Performance and the Visible Hand," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14751.
    17. John P. Formby & Paul D. Thistle & James P. Keeler, 1990. "Costs under Regulation and Deregulation: The Case of US Passenger Airlines," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 66(4), pages 308-321, December.
    18. Kaire Põder, 2010. "Credible commitment and cartel: the case of the Hansa merchant in the guild of late medieval Tallin," Baltic Journal of Economics, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 43-60, June.
    19. Argandoña, Antonio, 2000. "Sobre la corrupción," IESE Research Papers D/418, IESE Business School.
    20. Rajeev Goel & Daniel Rich, 1989. "On the economic incentives for taking bribes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 269-275, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:423-436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.