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The Logic of "Irrational" Politics: Nixon's Reelection Committee

Author

Listed:
  • Richard B. McKenzie

    (Clemson University)

  • Bruce Yandle

    (Clemson University)

Abstract

President Nixon's re-election committee had in 1972 more than $50 million with which to wage its campaign against George McGovern. Because it was commonly presumed that Nixon would easily win the election, the "dirty tricks" and the Watergate burglary have been variously described as "irrational" and "illogical" acts, as well as inept campaign management. Observers of the 1972 campaign have assumed that the unfair campaign activities in 1972 were in duced by the abundance of campaign funds which the Republicans had. Ac cordingly, restrictions on campaign expenditures have been legislated. In this article, a theory of campaign expenditures is formulated, leading to an under standing ofpolitical expenditures on what are called "productive" and "preda tory" political strategies. With the model that is developed, alternative policies for reducing "predatory politics" are evaluated.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard B. McKenzie & Bruce Yandle, 1980. "The Logic of "Irrational" Politics: Nixon's Reelection Committee," Public Finance Review, , vol. 8(1), pages 39-55, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:8:y:1980:i:1:p:39-55
    DOI: 10.1177/109114218000800103
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-257, April.
    2. William Welch, 1974. "The economics of campaign funds," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-97, December.
    3. Adamany, David, 1977. "Money, Politics, and Democracy: A Review Essay," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 289-304, March.
    4. Russell Pittman, 1977. "Market structure and campaign contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 37-52, September.
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