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Description of the Bluffing Phenomenon in the Untrusted Seller–Buyer Relationship via the Wigner Function of the q-Deformed Quantum Harmonic Oscillator Model

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  • E. I. Jafarov

Abstract

The q -deformed quantum harmonic oscillator model is applied to the description of the untrusted seller–buyer relationship. We assumed that the demand law by the buyer is described through the square modulus of the wavefunctions of the q -oscillator model in the position representation, whereas the supply law by the seller is described through the square modulus of the wavefunctions in the momentum representation. Thus, their untrusted relationship is described through the q -oscillator Wigner function of the stationary states in terms of the Al Salam-Chihara polynomials. As an example, we study the first excited state and show that the finite-difference differentiation parameter h or the deformation parameter q generated through it can be considered as a parameter defining the level of the bluffing phenomenon in this untrusted relationship. JEL Classifications: C02, D01, D11, D46, D58, D81

Suggested Citation

  • E. I. Jafarov, 2025. "Description of the Bluffing Phenomenon in the Untrusted Seller–Buyer Relationship via the Wigner Function of the q-Deformed Quantum Harmonic Oscillator Model," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 13(2), pages 247-266, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:miceco:v:13:y:2025:i:2:p:247-266
    DOI: 10.1177/23210222241262171
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Felix Kubler & Larry Selden & Xiao Wei, 2013. "Inferior Good and Giffen Behavior for Investing and Borrowing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 1034-1053, April.
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    5. Lanier, Joshua, 2020. "Risk, ambiguity, and Giffen assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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