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Measuring Strategic Stability with Two-Strike Nuclear Exchange Models

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  • Jeffrey H. Grotte

    (Institute for Defense Analyses)

Abstract

This article presents a quantification of the notion of strategic stability as it pertains to changes in U.S. and Soviet nuclear postures. Based on the use of two-strike strategic exchange models, this approach can be used to measure the degree to which proposed posture changes are stabilizing or destablizing. The categories "predominantly stabilizing" and "predominantly destabilizing" are introduced to describe changes which, in sequence, produce respectively stabilizing and destabilizing results.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey H. Grotte, 1980. "Measuring Strategic Stability with Two-Strike Nuclear Exchange Models," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(2), pages 213-239, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:24:y:1980:i:2:p:213-239
    DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. D. L. Brito & M. D. Intriligator, 1974. "Uncertainty and the Stability of the Armaments Race," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 3, number 1, pages 279-292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. McGuire, Martin, 1977. "A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 59(3), pages 328-339, August.
    3. Jerome Bracken & James E. Falk & Frederic A. Miercort, 1977. "A Strategic Weapons Exchange Allocation Model," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 968-976, December.
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