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The Centralisation of the Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign against Corruption and Its Implications

Author

Listed:
  • Fung Chan

    (School of Social Sciences, The University of Auckland, New Zealand lcha521@aucklanduni.ac.nz)

  • Biyang Sun

    (Faculty of Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong bsun@fandm.edu)

Abstract

Following the initiation of the policy of ‘Reform and Open Door’, the possibilities for public officials to trade power for private gain in China increased. To tackle the problem of corruption, different levels of Discipline Inspection Commissions (DICs) in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated investigation related to various corruption cases. However, due to the nature of the administrative set-up in China, the local DICs could not effectively carry out their functions. As a result, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was compelled to take on a bigger role, including controlling personnel appointments in local DICs and dispatching inspection teams to local jurisdictions. This strategy also enabled the central government and the top leadership of the CCP to build up a positive image with respect to fighting corruption. Nevertheless, the discretionary power of the top party leaders that has been enhanced through these centralisation measures leads to doubts over the real motives behind the CCP’s anti-corruption efforts. In March 2018, the National Supervision Commission (NSC) was established as the highest governmental anti-corruption agency, but more time is needed to judge the effectiveness of this new institution.

Suggested Citation

  • Fung Chan & Biyang Sun, 2018. "The Centralisation of the Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign against Corruption and Its Implications," China Report, , vol. 54(4), pages 403-420, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:chnrpt:v:54:y:2018:i:4:p:403-420
    DOI: 10.1177/0009445518795992
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chengze Simon Fan & Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 195-206.
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