The Ownership Structure As A Corporate Governance Mechanism In Serbian Hotels
This article analyses the development in Serbien tourism sector during the last decade. The article is focused on the ownership structure and company performance in the light of corporate governance theory and the actuel privatisation process. Previous research has proven that Serbien state is a poor and pasive owner, whereas private owners and amployees are more active and more interested in their company’s economic performance. This article shows that the transition to private ownership in the Serbian hotels sector has not been finished. Consequently, state-owned and investment funds remain important owners of Serbien hotels. The financial performance of hotel companies is below average in the economy and can be correlated with the current ownership structure. Since the current ownership structure has a negative impact on the hotel sector competitiveness, an ownership change is needed to boost the sector’s competitivensess and the competitivensess of Serbia as tourist destination.
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- Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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- Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
- Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 08-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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