Landlocked Countries: A Way to Integrate with Coastal Economies
We consider some of the important economic constraints faced by landlocked economies in a game theoretic framework that involves its neighbor that has access to the ocean. We identify the strengths that the landlocked economy might have or develop through policy in order to negotiate with its neighbor. The model is an infinitely repeated game between two asymmetric economies, with the threat of reversion to Nash equilibrium if an economy deviates from the cooperative agreement. We find that sustainable cooperative equilibriums that are Pareto superior do exist, drawing attention to the benefits of economic cooperation between neighbors even if they differ on geographical, political, or diplomatic issues. We do several robustness checks that further bring out the constraints and policy implications for the landlocked economies.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:integr:0583. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jong-Eun Lee)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.