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Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long?

Author

Listed:
  • Rose, Andrew K.

    () (University of California, Berkeley)

  • Moser, Christoph

    () (ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute)

Abstract

The Doha multilateral round of trade negotiations sponsored by the WTO has been dragging on for over a decade, with no end in sight. In this short paper we assess empirically what determines the duration of trade negotiations, focusing on the span between the start of trade talks and their conclusion. We use data from 88 regional trade agreements between 1988 and 2009, and a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model. Four factors are robust determinants of the length of RTA negotiations. Negotiations are more protracted when there are more countries at the negotiation table, and when the countries are not from the same region. Negotiations between more open and richer countries also finish more quickly.

Suggested Citation

  • Rose, Andrew K. & Moser, Christoph, 2012. "Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long?," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 27, pages 280-290.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:integr:0573
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:revint:v:13:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9276-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Florian Mölders, 2016. "On the Path to Trade Liberalisation: Political Regimes in Trade Negotiations," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(7), pages 890-924, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regional; GATT; WTO; Duration; Income; Data; Empirical; Cox; Survival;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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