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Los aportes de Eduardo Wiesner al pensamiento económico colombiano

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  • Jorge Iván González

    (Universidades Externado de Colombia y Nacional de Colombia)

Abstract

This article summarizes the main line thought of Eduardo Wiesner, who has greatly influenced Colombian public policy. Wiesner is aware of the most important discussions on contemporary economic theory and has been able to convert them into legislative proposals. He shows the importance of market incentives from different angles, without denying the central role of the institutions. His careful approach has not been reflected in the resulting laws, which end up contaminated by the simplistic spirit of technocracy. Wiesner studies the passage from individual choice to collective choice from the optic of public choice theory, and plays down the importance of the impossibilities derived from the social election theory. The article criticizes this option because it leads people to wrongly think that the market logic can be applied to a wide range of goods, including education and health.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Iván González, 2006. "Los aportes de Eduardo Wiesner al pensamiento económico colombiano," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 8(14), pages 17-53, January-J.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:8:y:2006:i:14:p:17-53
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/jgonzalez14.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eduardo Wiesner; Colombian economic thought; public policy; public choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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