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An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability

Author

Listed:
  • Kiho Yoon

    (Sogang University)

Abstract

We study the effect of limited observability on the possibility of cooperation in a simple overlapping generations model. If new entrants can observe only the recent history of the game, then cooperation cannot be sustained for certain classes of games. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Kiho Yoon, 2001. "An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 736-745, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:736-745
    DOI: 10.1006/redy.2000.0127
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92.
    3. V. Bhaskar, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 135-149.
    4. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July.
    5. Jacques Cremer, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49.
    6. Salant, David J., 1991. "A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 244-259, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    anti-folk theorem; limited observability; overlapping generations games;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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