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Leistungsorientierte Bezahlung in der oeffentlichen Verwaltung: Eine neoinstitutionalistische Analyse (Performance-related Pay in Public Administration: A New Institutional Analysis)

Author

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  • Katharina Joerges-Suess
  • Stefan Suess

Abstract

Die Einfuehrung einer leistungsorientierten Bezahlung der Arbeitnehmer und Beamten in der oeffentlichen Verwaltung Deutschlands wird seit den 1970er Jahren diskutiert. Entsprechende Regelungen wurden erst vor einigen Jahren geschaffen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird im Beitrag die Debatte ueber die Ermoeglichung des Leistungsbezugs rekonstruiert und erklaert. Dies erfolgt auf Grundlage einer akteurstheoretischen Erweiterung des Soziologischen Neoinstitutionalismus in Form einer qualitativen Analyse von Sekundaermaterial. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass Veraenderungsprozesse in der oeffentlichen Verwaltung insbesondere aufgrund der (heterogenen) Erwartungen unterschiedlicher Umweltsegmente nur sehr langsam verlaufen. Die Einfuehrung der leistungsorientierten Bezahlung ist infolgedessen eher eine passive Reaktion auf die Krise der staatlichen Haushalte sowie auf die mangelnde Modernitaet und Wirtschaftlichkeit der Verwaltung als die aktive Umsetzung einer gezielten Personalstrategie. (There has been a discussion in Germany concerning the implementation of performance-related pay for employees and civil servants in public administration since the 1970s. Relevant regulations were finally created some years ago. Against this background, the paper reconstructs and explains the debate concerning the possibility of performance-related pay. This is done by means of an action-theoretical expansion of sociological new institutionalism via a qualitative analysis of secondary data. The result shows that processes of change in public administration tend to be slow, particularly due to the (heterogeneous) expectations of different environmental sections. The implementation of performance-related pay in German public administration thus represents a passive reaction to state budget crises and to the lack of modernity and efficiency in administration rather than the active implementation of a human-resource strategy.)

Suggested Citation

  • Katharina Joerges-Suess & Stefan Suess, 2011. "Leistungsorientierte Bezahlung in der oeffentlichen Verwaltung: Eine neoinstitutionalistische Analyse (Performance-related Pay in Public Administration: A New Institutional Analysis)," Industrielle Beziehungen - Zeitschrift fuer Arbeit, Organisation und Management - The German Journal of Industrial Relations, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 18(1-2), pages 99-118.
  • Handle: RePEc:rai:indbez:doi_10.1688/1862-0035_indb_2011_01-02_joerges-suess
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    Keywords

    new institutionalism; performance-related pay; public administration;

    JEL classification:

    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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