IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/qnt/quantl/y2013i11p41-60.html

Empirical analysis of imperfect competition in the rice market in the Asia-Pacific region (in Russian)

Author

Listed:
  • Andrey Lipin

    (Eurasian Economic Commission, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

Repetitive interactions among players are common to many actual markets. If this is complemented by guaranteed sales markets and the presence of dominant players, then it creates natural conditions for coordination. Economic theory suggests that the decline in competition up to the cartel level can provide higher profitability. However, coordination in such markets may alternate with competition and price wars. The observed rice prices of major Asian exporters demonstrate similar dynamics, which implies coordination of their actions. However, it is an open question how close this behavior is to that of a cartel. Using monthly data on export sales of rice from 1997, the study examines the degree of imperfect competition and the possibility of collusion. Estimation is carried out using the generalized method of moments.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey Lipin, 2013. "Empirical analysis of imperfect competition in the rice market in the Asia-Pacific region (in Russian)," Quantile, Quantile, issue 11, pages 41-60, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:qnt:quantl:y:2013:i:11:p:41-60
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://quantile.ru/11/11-AL.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Slade, Margaret E, 1987. "Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 499-516, June.
    3. repec:bla:econom:v:56:y:1989:i:223:p:295-310 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1985. "Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-152, June.
    5. Slade, Margaret E., 1990. "Strategic pricing models and interpretation of price-war data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 524-537, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
    2. Timothy Richards, 2007. "A nested logit model of strategic promotion," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 63-91, March.
    3. Ghosal, Vivek, 2000. "Product market competition and the industry price-cost markup fluctuations:: role of energy price and monetary changes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 415-444, April.
    4. Garrod, Luke, 2012. "Collusive price rigidity under price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 471-482.
    5. Elzinga, Kenneth G. & Mills, David E., 1999. "Price wars triggered by entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 179-198, February.
    6. Steen, Frode & Foros, Øystein, 2008. "Gasoline prices jump up on Mondays: An outcome of aggressive competition?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6783, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    7. Neukirch Arne & Wein Thomas, 2019. "Price Gouging at the Pump? The Lerner Index and the German Fuel Market," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 70(2), pages 157-192, August.
    8. Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
    9. Richards, Timothy J. & Patterson, Paul M., 2002. "Strategic Interaction With Multiple Tools: A New Empirical Model," Working Papers 28545, Arizona State University, Morrison School of Agribusiness and Resource Management.
    10. Davies, Stephen & Olczak, Matthew & Coles, Heather, 2011. "Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: Evidence from EC merger cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 221-231, March.
    11. Goto, Ujo & McKenzie, C.R., 2002. "Price collusion and deregulation in the Japanese retail gasoline market," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 187-195.
    12. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2002. "Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 287-306, November.
    13. Slade, Margaret E, 1995. "Product Rivalry with Multiple Strategic Weapons: An Analysis of Price and Advertising Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 445-476, Fall.
    14. Justine S. Hastings, 2004. "Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 317-328, March.
    15. Vivek Ghosal, 2008. "The Genesis Of Cartel Investigations: Some Insights From Examining The Dynamic Interrelationships Between U.S. Civil And Criminal Antitrust Investigations," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 61-88.
    16. Clark, Robert & Coviello, Decio & de Leverano, Adriano, 2020. "Complementary bidding and the collusive arrangement: Evidence from an antitrust investigation," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-052, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    17. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers 084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    18. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak & Heather Coles, 2007. "Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: evidence from EC merger cases," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-07, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    19. Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    20. Gayle, Philip G. & Faheem, Adeel, 2024. "Post and hold regulation and competitive conduct: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C36 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q11 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis; Prices
    • Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qnt:quantl:y:2013:i:11:p:41-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stanislav Anatolyev (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://quantile.ru/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.