Empirical analysis of imperfect competition in the rice market in the Asia-Pacific region (in Russian)
Repetitive interactions among players are common to many actual markets. If this is complemented by guaranteed sales markets and the presence of dominant players, then it creates natural conditions for coordination. Economic theory suggests that the decline in competition up to the cartel level can provide higher profitability. However, coordination in such markets may alternate with competition and price wars. The observed rice prices of major Asian exporters demonstrate similar dynamics, which implies coordination of their actions. However, it is an open question how close this behavior is to that of a cartel. Using monthly data on export sales of rice from 1997, the study examines the degree of imperfect competition and the possibility of collusion. Estimation is carried out using the generalized method of moments.
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