I teoremi di Modigliani-Miller: una pietra miliare della finanza
The theorems of Modigliani and Miller (MM) is a cornerstone of finance for two reasons.The first is substantial and is derived from the nature of "propositions irrelevant": they identify a case in which the financial structure and dividend policy will not affect the value of firms, and in doing so give us a clear point of reference to understand instead what circumstances these decisions affect the value of firms, and why. In fact, the whole subsequent evolution of corporate finance has explored the consequences of removing the assumptions of MM. The second reason for the importance of the fundamental theorems of MM is methodological: they have been demonstrated with a reasoning based arbitrage, which has set a precedent not only in the area of ??corporate finance but also in that of the determination of prices of financial securities.
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