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Les taxes environnementales : un instrument d’incitation ou de financement ?

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  • Jean-Philippe Barde
  • Boris Cournede

Abstract

[fre] La nécessité de mettre en oeuvre des politiques de l’environnement efficaces et économiquement efficientes devient de plus en plus cruciale, notamment en matière de lutte contre le changement climatique. En l’occurrence, les « mécanismes de flexibilité » prévus par le Protocole de Kyoto ont précisément pour objet d’introduire une logique économique destinée à répondre à cette exigence d’efficacité. Grâce à leur potentiel d’efficacité statique et dynamique, les « instruments économiques » pour la protection de l’environnement se sont considérablement développés dans les pays industrialisés. La dernière décennie a connu une utilisation croissante des taxes environnementales. De même, dans le cadre des permis négociables, si l’allocation initiale des permis est effectuée par vente, il s’agit d’une approche quasi fiscale. Cet article se propose d’analyser ces instruments économiques. . Classification JEL : H21, H23, Q01 [eng] Environmental taxes : an instrument of incentive or of financing ? . The need to implement effective and environmentally efficient environmental policies is becoming more and more crucial, notably in the fight against climate change. In this case, the « mechanisms of flexibility » envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol are precisely aimed at introducing an economic logic that is intended to respond to this requirement for efficiency. Thanks to their potential for static and dynamic efficiency, the « economic instruments » for the protection of the environment are considerably developed amongst the industrialised countries. The last decade has seen a growing use of environmental taxes. Similarly, within the framework of negotiable permits, if the initial allocation of licences is carried out by sale, this then becomes a quasi-fiscal approach. This article sets out to analyse these economic instruments. . JEL classifications : H21, H23, Q01

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Philippe Barde & Boris Cournede, 2002. "Les taxes environnementales : un instrument d’incitation ou de financement ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 66(2), pages 119-134.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2002_num_66_2_3746
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2002.3746
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2002.3746
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo, 2001. "Tax earmarking and grass-roots accountability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 99-106, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q01 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Sustainable Development
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q01 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Sustainable Development

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