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Neutralité actuarielle et propriétés redistributives des systèmes de retraite

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  • Florence Legros

Abstract

[fre] Neutralité actuarielle et propriétés redistributives des systèmes de retraite . En matière de retraite, un critère de neutralité assez naturel est celui de l'équivalence entre l'ensemble des cotisations versées et l'ensemble des prestations reçues, au cours du cycle de vie. Comment se situent les différents systèmes nationaux par rapport à cette norme ? Les systèmes de tradition bismarckienne, appelés aussi « assurantiels », sont ceux qui devraient s'en rapprocher le plus ; mais les écarts entre espérances de vie, en duisant des effets anti-redistributifs, les éloignent de cette neutralité. Les systèmes dits beveridgiens compensent en partie ces inégalités : ils versent des prestations forfaitaires indépendantes du revenu ou des contributions passées. Mais ils ne remplissent qu'imparfaitement la fonction de remplacement du revenu perdu lors du passage à la retraite - sauf lorsque ce revenu est faible - ce qui impose le recours à des couvertures privées complémentaires. [spa] Neutralidad actuarial y propiedades redistributivas de los sistemas de jubilaciôn . En cuanto a jubilaciôn, un criterio de neutralidad bastante natural es el de la equivalencia entre la totalidad de las cotizaciones abonadas y la totalidad de las prestaciones recibidas, a lo largo del ciclo de vida. ïCômo se sitûan los diferentes sistemas nationales respecto a esta norma? Los sistemas de tradiciôn bismarckiana, también llamados "aseguramentales", son los que mâs se acercan a este criterio ; pero las diferencias entre las esperanzas de vida, al introducir unos efectos antiredistributivos, los alejan de esta neutralidad. Los llamados sistemas beveridgienses compensan por parte estas desi- gualdades : pagan unas prestaciones globales sin relaciôn con la renta o las contribuciones anteriores. Pero no cumplen sino de manera imperfecta su funciôn de reemplazo de la renta perdida al jubilarse la gente - excepto si la renta es poca - lo que impone el recurso a unas coberturas privadas complementarias. [eng] The Non-Discriminatory Actuarial Evaluation and the Redistributive Properties of the Pension Systems . A fairly natural impartiality criterion for pensions is that of the equivalence between all the contributions paid and all the benefits received over the life cycle. How do the different national systems score as regards this norm? The Bismarck-based systems, also called "insurance" systems, should come closest. However, life expectancy deviations introduce anti-redistributive effects, thereby distancing them from this impartiality. The Beveridge-based systems partially offset these inequalities by paying out flat-rate benefits regardless of income and past contributions. However, they are imperfect when it comes to replacing lost income at retirement - except when this income is low - which imposes the use of supplementary private coverage. [ger] Versicherungsmathematische Neutralitât und Umverteilungsmerkmale der Rentenversicherungssysteme . Bei der Rentenversicherung ist die Àquivalenz zwischen dem Gesamtbetrag der Beitràge und dem Gesamtbetrag der Leistungen, die wàhrend des Lebenszyklus gezahlt bzw. bezogen werden, ein recht natiirliches Neutralitâts- kriterium. Wie lassen sich die verschiedenen nationalen Système hinsichtlich dieser Norm einstufen? Die bismarckschen Système, die auf dem Versicherungs- prinzip basieren, kommen ihr sicherlich am nâchsten. Bei Einbeziehung von Antiumverteilungseffekten entfernen sie sich jedoch aufgrund der unterschiedlichen . Lebenserwartungen von dieser Neutralitât. Die sogenannten beveridgeschen Système kompensieren diese Ungleichheiten zum Teil, da bei ihnen pauschale Leistungen gezahlt werden, die einkommens- und beitragsunabhângig sind. Sie erfûllen allerdings nur unvollkommen die Funktion des Ersatzes des bei Eintritt in den Ruhestand verlorenen Einkommens, es sei denn, dieses Einkommen ist gering, was den Ruckgriff auf eine private Zusatzversicherung erforderlich macht.

Suggested Citation

  • Florence Legros, 1996. "Neutralité actuarielle et propriétés redistributives des systèmes de retraite," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 173-183.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1996_num_291_1_6038
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1996.6038
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1996.6038
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