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Les modes de rémunération et le rapport salarial

  • Bénédicte Reynaud

[eng] Wage Schemes and Labour Relations, . by Bénédicte Reynaud.. . In order to get work of a certain degree of intensity and quality, monetary incentives or hierarchical organization within the firm are two concurrent means that can be used. On the basis of the 1986 survey on the structure of the wages of manual workers of the manufacturing and services sectors, it was shown that this theoretical substituability proves to be true only if wages are calculated with reference to results. Some non-incentive wage systems (without bonuses) are connected with weak hierarchical organizations. Using the concept of work checking as advocated by the radical American school, (R. Edwards), five different capital-labour configurations can be set up: simple checking for both skilled and unskilled labour, Taylorist and Fordist checking and bureaucratic checking. Firms' size, the organization of the work process, and the sectors involved are the main factors explaining why a firm belongs to one or another of these groups. [spa] Los modos de remuneración y la relación salarial, . por Bénédicte Reynaud.. . Para mejorar tanto la intensidad como la calidad del trabajo, existen dos dispositivos relativamente rivales : las incitaciones monetarias y la organización jerárquica de la empresa. A partir de la encuesta de 1986 sobre la estructura de los salarios para los obreros de la industria y de los servicios, se ha mostrado que esta posición teórica no ha sido verificada más que para las formas de salario incitativas (salario al rendimiento individual o colectivo). Ciertas formas de salario no incitativas (sin prima) están asociadas a una organización jerárquica frágil. Mediante la noción de control del trabajo desarrollada por la escuela radical norteamericana (R. Edwards), se pueden définir cinco configuraciones de la relación salarial : el simple control de una mano de obra no cualificada o de una mano de obra cualificada, los controles técnicos de Taylor y Ford y el control burocrático. El tamaño de las empresas, la organización del trabajo, el sector, son los principales factores que los estructuran. [ger] Entlohnungsverfahren und Lohnarbeitsverhältnis, . von Bénédicte Reynaud.. . Zur gleichzeitigen Förderung von Wirksamkeit und Qualität der Arbeit bestehen zwei mehr Oder weniger konkurrierende Système : die Geldanreize und die hierarchische Organisation des Betriebs. Auf der Grundlage der 1986 durchgeführten Untersuchung zum Gefüge der Arbeiterlöhne in der Industrie und im Dienstleistungssektor wird gezeigt, dass diese theoretische Substitutionsmöglichkeit nur für die auf Anreizen beruhenden Lohnformen (individuelle Oder kollektive Leistungslöhne) zutrifft. Gewisse leistungsunabhangige Lohnformen (ohne Prämie) sind mit einem geringen hierarchischen Organisationsgrad korreliert. Anhand des Begriffs der Arbeitskontrolle, der von der "radikalen" amerikanischen Schule entwickelt wurde, lassen sich fünf Formen des Lohnarbeitsverhältnisses definieren : die einfachen Kontrollen ungelernter Oder qualifizierter Arbeitskräfte, die von Taylor und Ford angewandten technischen Kontrollen und die bürokratische Kontrolle. Die Grösse der Betriebe, ihre Arbeitsorganisation und der Wirtschaftssektor sind die wichtigsten ihnen zugrundeliegenden Faktoren. [fre] Les modes de rémunération et le rapport salarial, . par Bénédicte Reynaud.. . Pour susciter à la fois intensité et qualité du travail, deux dispositifs relativement concurrents existent: les incitations monétaires et l'organisation hiérarchique de l'entreprise. A partir de l'enquête de 1986 sur la structure des salaires pour les ouvriers de l'industrie et des services, on montre que cette position théorique n'est vérifiée que pour les formes de salaire incitatives (salaire au rendement individuel ou collectif). Certaines formes de salaire non incitatives (sans prime) sont associées à une organisation hiérarchique faible. A l'aide de la notion de contrôle du travail, développée par l'école radicale américaine (R. Edwards), on peut définir cinq configurations du rapport salarial : le contrôle simple d'une main-d'œuvre non qualifiée ou d'une main-d'oœvre qualifiée, les contrôles techniques taylorien et fordien et le contrôle bureaucratique. La taille des entreprises, l'organisation du travail, le secteur, sont les principaux facteurs qui les structurent.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 92 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-14

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5152
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1990.5152
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  1. Peaucelle Irina & Petit Pascal, 1988. "Croissance économique, profit et formes de motivations salariales/ii : l'incidence de la protection sociale," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8803, CEPREMAP.
  2. Bénédicte Reynaud, 1986. "Règles et logique des relations salariales," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 192(1), pages 43-63.
  3. Bowles, Samuel & Boyer, Robert, 1988. "Labor Discipline and Aggregate Demand: A Macroeconomic Model," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8sb2623g, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1985. "The Inefficiency of Unemployment: The Supervision Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(2), pages 373-87, May.
  5. Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1979. "Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 991-1010, October.
  6. Samuel Bowles and Robert Boyer., 1988. "Labor Discipline and Aggregate Demand: A Macroeconomic Model," Economics Working Papers 8875, University of California at Berkeley.
  7. Olivier Favereau, 1989. "Marchés internes, marchés externes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 273-328.
  8. Philippe Madinier & Thomas Coutrot, 1987. "Les compléments du salaire : un apport non négligeable, surtout dans l'industrie lourde," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 203(1), pages 23-36.
  9. Michel Volle & Bernard Guibert & Jean Laganier, 1971. "Essai sur les nomenclatures industrielles," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 20(1), pages 23-36.
  10. Bénédicte Reynaud-Cressent, 1985. "Structures industrielles et segmentation du marché du travail : théorie radicale et nouveau structuralisme," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(1), pages 16-32.
  11. Bowles, Samuel & Boyer, Robert, 1988. "Labor Discipline and Aggregate Demand: A Macroeconomic Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 395-400, May.
  12. Schor, Juliet B & Bowles, Samuel, 1987. "Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(4), pages 584-92, November.
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