IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Teorie her, formování koalic a koncentrace politické moci v zastupitelstvu hlavního města Prahy
[Game Theory, Coalition Formation and Political Power Concentration in the Prague City Assembly]


  • Martin Dlouhý


The objective of the paper is to study the political development in the Prague City Assembly after three elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014. The theory of voting games, the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indexes, and theories of coalition formation are used for an analysis of possible majority coalitions. We developed the mayor’s power index that measures the probability that the party will be the strongest party in the majority coalition with the right having a mayor. Measures of concentration of political power are used for evaluating the processes of political fragmentation. The increased number of political parties represented in the Prague City Assembly highly increased the number of possible coalitions and the number of political parties needed to form majority coalitions. The process of political fragmentation is probably not limited only to the Prague City Assembly.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Dlouhý, 2016. "Teorie her, formování koalic a koncentrace politické moci v zastupitelstvu hlavního města Prahy
    [Game Theory, Coalition Formation and Political Power Concentration in the Prague City Assembly]
    ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2016(6), pages 747-761.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2016:y:2016:i:6:id:1107:p:747-761

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free of charge

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free of charge

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. František Turnovec, 2007. "New Measure of Voting Power," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 04-14, March.
    2. Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2005. "Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 485-506, December.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    game theory; coalition formation; Shapley-Shubik power index; mayor’s power index; Prague City Assembly;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2016:y:2016:i:6:id:1107:p:747-761. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frantisek Sokolovsky). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.