Mesoscopic Effects in an Agent-Based Bargaining Model in Regular Lattices
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DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0017661
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References listed on IDEAS
- Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
- Michihiro Kandori, 1992.
"Social Norms and Community Enforcement,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
- Michi Kandori, 2010. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Levine's Working Paper Archive 630, David K. Levine.
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- Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Vicario, Eugenio, 2024. "Memory retrieval in the demand game with a few possible splits: Unfair conventions emerge in fair settings," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
- Su, Lichen & Yang, Zhengzhi & Zhou, Bowen & Zhang, Naitian & Li, Yumeng, 2023. "Effects of interdependent network reciprocity on the evolution of public cooperation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 454(C).
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