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Auto Credit and the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform: The Impact of Eliminating Cramdowns

Author

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  • Rajashri Chakrabarti
  • Nathaniel Pattison

Abstract

Auto lenders were perhaps the biggest winners of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform, as Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers can no longer “cramdown” the amount owed on recent auto loans. We estimate the causal effect of this anticramdown provision on the price and quantity of auto credit. Exploiting historical variation in states’ usage of Chapter 13 bankruptcy, we find strong evidence that eliminating cramdowns decreased interest rates and some evidence that loan sizes increased among subprime borrowers. The decline in interest rates is persistent and is robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. We rule out other reform changes as possible causes.Received September 29, 2016; editorial decision January 15, 2019 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajashri Chakrabarti & Nathaniel Pattison, 2019. "Auto Credit and the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform: The Impact of Eliminating Cramdowns," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(12), pages 4734-4766.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:32:y:2019:i:12:p:4734-4766.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhz039
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    Cited by:

    1. Tal Gross & Raymond Kluender & Feng Liu & Matthew J. Notowidigdo & Jialan Wang, 2021. "The Economic Consequences of Bankruptcy Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2309-2341, July.
    2. Mikhed, Vyacheslav & Raina, Sahil & Scholnick, Barry & Zhang, Man, 2024. "Debtor income manipulation in consumer credit contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    3. Müller, Karsten, 2022. "Busy bankruptcy courts and the cost of credit," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(2), pages 824-845.
    4. Wei, Lu & Jing, Haozhe & Huang, Jie & Deng, Yuqi & Jing, Zhongbo, 2023. "Do textual risk disclosures reveal corporate risk? Evidence from U.S. fintech corporations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    5. Brian Jonghwan Lee, 2024. "Bankruptcy Lawyers and Credit Recovery," Working Papers 24-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. Pattison, Nathaniel, 2020. "Consumption smoothing and debtor protections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    7. Bose, Udichibarna & Filomeni, Stefano & Mallick, Sushanta, 2021. "Does bankruptcy law improve the fate of distressed firms? The role of credit channels," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Christa Gibbs & Benedict Guttman-Kenney & Donghoon Lee & Scott Nelson & Wilbert van der Klaauw & Jialan Wang, 2025. "Consumer Credit Reporting Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 598-636, June.
    9. Slava Mikhed & Sahil Raina & Barry Scholnick & Man Zhang, 2022. "Debtor Fraud in Consumer Debt Renegotiation," Working Papers 22-35, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    10. Zhang, Yunqi & Meng, Yu & Zhang, Xiaoyu, 2025. "Household debt overhang and bankruptcy abuse prevention," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    11. Sumit Agarwal & Slava Mikhed & Barry Scholnick & Man Zhang, 2022. "Reducing Strategic Default in a Financial Crisis," Working Papers 21-36, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law

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