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Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects

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  • Bengt Holmstrom
  • Laurence Weiss

Abstract

We explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive problem arises because one input factor (managerial effort) is not publicly observed. We show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first-best in low states and that this phenomenon can account for greater cyclical variability in aggregate production and investment. From the perspective of incentive scheme design, a special feature of the model is that screening takes place over two variables (investment and output) rather than one as is customary.

Suggested Citation

  • Bengt Holmstrom & Laurence Weiss, 1985. "Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 403-425.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:3:p:403-425.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297661
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    Cited by:

    1. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.
    2. Michael Ewens & Charles M. Jones & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, 2013. "The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(8), pages 1854-1889.
    3. Antle, Rick & Bogetoft, Peter & Stark, Andrew W., 2001. "Information systems, incentives and the timing of investments," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4-5), pages 267-294.
    4. Peter Ove Christensen & Gerald A. Feltham, 1993. "Communication in Multiperiod Agencies with Production and Financial Decisions," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(2), pages 706-744, March.
    5. Robert Heinkel & Josef Zechner, 1993. "Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(4), pages 531-565, December.
    6. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 47-74, March.
    7. Koutroumpis, Pantelis & Leiponen, Aija & Thomas, Llewellyn D W, 2017. "The (Unfulfilled) Potential of Data Marketplaces," ETLA Working Papers 53, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    8. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D & Maskin, Eric S, 1983. "Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 907-928, December.
    9. Rampini, Adriano A., 2004. "Entrepreneurial activity, risk, and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 555-573, April.
    10. Tae-Young Paik & Pradyot K. Sen, 1995. "Project Evaluation and Control in Decentralized Firms: Is Capital Rationing Always Optimal?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(8), pages 1404-1414, August.
    11. Hornstein, Abigail S., 2013. "Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 41-58.
    12. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    13. Bengt Holmstrom & I. Ricard & Joan Costa, 1984. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    14. Bernat, G. Andrew, Jr., 1987. "Share Leasing And Production Efficiency," Staff Reports 278000, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    15. Sun, Yunpeng & Bao, Qun & Lu, Zhou, 2021. "Coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak, investor sentiment, and medical portfolio: Evidence from China, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, and U.S," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    16. Romi Adetio Setiawan, 2022. "Issues in Islamic Derivatives and Proposals for Reforms in the OTC Market in Indonesia," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-16, May.
    17. Salman Shah & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Private versus Public Ownership: Investment, Ownership Distribution, and Optimality," Finance 0411026, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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