IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v61y2009i4p761-775.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Who pays brokers' commissions? Evidence from fine wine auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Denton Marks

Abstract

As brokers between consignors and buyers, auction houses routinely charge successful bidders a broker's commission—a percent of their successful bids. This study considers the extent to which differences in brokers' commissions are reflected in differences in winning bids in fine wine auctions, drawing upon an unusually detailed collection of auction data for Bordeaux wine and providing a 'natural experiment' for testing the incidence of brokers' commissions. The data allow not only a test of the extent to which the commission charged to buyers is reflected in the buyers' bids but also a reasonably comprehensive explanation of variations in wine auction prices. The results indicate that buyers' premia are capitalized fully into bids so that bids fall accordingly with obvious consequences for the proceeds from the sale. Copyright 2009 , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Denton Marks, 2009. "Who pays brokers' commissions? Evidence from fine wine auctions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 761-775, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:61:y:2009:i:4:p:761-775
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpp003
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Toshihiro Tsuchihashi & Yusuke Zennyo, 2021. "Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 209-218, January.
    2. Onur, Ilke & Bruwer, Johan & Lockshin, Larry, 2020. "Reducing information asymmetry in the auctioning of non-perishable experience goods: The case of online wine auctions," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Spaenjers, Christophe & Goetzmann, William N. & Mamonova, Elena, 2015. "The economics of aesthetics and record prices for art since 1701," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 79-94.
    4. William Goetzmann & Elena Mamonova & Christophe Spaenjers, 2014. "The Economics of Aesthetics and Three Centuries of Art Price Records," NBER Working Papers 20440, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Dimson, Elroy & Rousseau, Peter L. & Spaenjers, Christophe, 2015. "The price of wine," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 431-449.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:61:y:2009:i:4:p:761-775. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.