Asymmetric Regulation and Incentives for Innovation
Under asymmetric regulation, different firms in the same industry are subjected to different levels of regulatory restraint. We analyze the nature of innovation rivalry in such an industry, emphasizing that a rival may be able to inexpensively imitate an innovator's successful new technology. Although asymmetric regulation may slow the industry-wide pace of innovation, it does not necessarily do so. In fact, by weakening incentive to imitate, regulation may make an unregulated entrant's innovation profitable, thereby accelerating innovation. Conversely, giving the regulated firm incentives may backfire by producing either excessive or insufficient innovation; these negative outcomes are more likely the greater the cost-reducing potential offered by the new technology. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 4 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://icc.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:4:y:1995:i:4:p:769-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.