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Foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization
[‘Capture and governance at local and national levels’]

Author

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  • Sebastian G. Kessing
  • Kai A. Konrad
  • Christos Kotsogiannis

Abstract

VERTICAL, HORIZONTAL, AND FDIBoth in the developed and developing world, decentralization of fiscal policy is frequently argued to foster investment, because allowing investors to choose between competing locations should make it difficult for each jurisdiction to tax the investment's returns. We point out that this ‘horizontal’ dimension of decentralization cannot eliminate ex post incentives to tax investments once they are irreversibly located in a jurisdiction, and that the negative ex ante investment effects of such ‘hold up’ problems are actually stronger when decentralization inevitably leads to multiple levels of taxation power in each location. Empirically, we detect significant negative effects on FDI of the ‘vertical’ dimension of decentralization, measured by the number of government layers, in a data set containing many countries and many suitable control variables. Indicators of overall fiscal decentralization do not appear to affect the investment climate negatively per se, but our theoretical arguments and empirical results suggest that policymakers should consider very carefully the form and degree of government decentralization if they aim at improving the investment climate.— Sebastian G. Kessing, Kai A. Konrad and Christos Kotsogiannis

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian G. Kessing & Kai A. Konrad & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2007. "Foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization [‘Capture and governance at local and national levels’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 22(49), pages 6-70.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:22:y:2007:i:49:p:6-70.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2007.00172.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferraresi, Massimiliano & Kotsogiannis, Christos & Rizzo, Leonzio & Secomandi, Riccardo, 2020. "The ‘Great Lockdown’ and its determinants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    2. Carsten Hefeker & Sebastian G. Kessing, 2017. "Competition for natural resources and the hold-up problem," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(3), pages 871-888, August.
    3. Michael Beenstock & Daniel Felsenstein & Ziv Rubin, 2017. "Does foreign direct investment polarize regional earnings? Some evidence from Israel," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 385-409, October.
    4. Francesca Bartolacci & Rosanna Salvia & Giovanni Quaranta & Luca Salvati, 2022. "Seeking the Optimal Dimension of Local Administrative Units: A Reflection on Urban Concentration and Changes in Municipal Size," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-17, November.
    5. Ferraresi, Massimiliano & Kotsogiannis, Christos & Rizzo, Leonzio, 2018. "Decentralization and fuel subsidies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 275-286.
    6. Burret, Heiko T. & Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2022. "Fiscal federalism and economic performance new evidence from Switzerland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    7. Libman, Alexander & Stone, Randall W. & Vinokurov, Evgeny, 2022. "Russian power and the state-owned enterprise," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    8. Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2010. "One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 631-646, April.
    9. Feld, Lars P. & Köhler, Ekkehard A. & Palhuca, Leonardo & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2022. "Fiscal federalism and foreign direct investment: An empirical analysis," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 22/4, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    10. Lars P. Feld & Ekkehard A. Köhler & Leonardo Palhuca & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2021. "Federalism and Foreign Direct Investment - An Empirical Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 9120, CESifo.
    11. Kaushal Kishore, 2016. "Tax Competition, Policy Competition and the Strategic Use of Policy Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investments," Working Papers 201684, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    12. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Christos Kotsogiannis & Leonzio Rizzo & Riccardo Secomandi, 2020. "The ‘Great Lockdown’ and its Determinants," Working papers 91, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

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