IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/econjl/v132y2022i646p2173-2206..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Subsidy That is Inversely Related to the Product Price

Author

Listed:
  • Takahiko Kiso

Abstract

This study considers a new subsidy design to support the purchase or production of target products. Under the proposed design, subsidy payments are inversely related to product prices. Compared to ‘flat’ subsidies, this design reduces producers’ market power and the subsidy benefits passed on to them, improving the cost-effectiveness of government spending (by up to 50% according to simulations based on an actual subsidy programme). Additionally, this subsidy’s cost-effectiveness and incidence can be adjusted flexibly by changing the policy parameters. Finally, the subsidy design can be modified to provide larger payments to higher-quality products, thereby offsetting disincentives for quality improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Takahiko Kiso, 2022. "A Subsidy That is Inversely Related to the Product Price," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(646), pages 2173-2206.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:132:y:2022:i:646:p:2173-2206.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueac002
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
    2. E. Glen Weyl & Michal Fabinger, 2013. "Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 528-583.
    3. Shanjun Li & Lang Tong & Jianwei Xing & Yiyi Zhou, 2017. "The Market for Electric Vehicles: Indirect Network Effects and Policy Design," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(1), pages 89-133.
    4. Mark Johnston & Richard Zeckhauser, 1991. "The Australian Pharmaceutical Subsidy Gambit: Transmuting Deadweight Loss and Oligopoly Rents to Consumer Surplus," NBER Working Papers 3783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Valido, Jorge & Pilar Socorro, M. & Hernández, Aday & Betancor, Ofelia, 2014. "Air transport subsidies for resident passengers when carriers have market power," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 388-399.
    6. D. B. Suits & R. A. Musgrave, 1953. "Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes Compared," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 67(4), pages 598-604.
    7. Skeath, Susan E. & Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-71, January.
    8. Katalin Springel, 2021. "Network Externality and Subsidy Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from Electric Vehicle Incentives," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 393-432, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt & Christian Wey, 2025. "Comparing the Effects of Subsidies on Target Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 12010, CESifo.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ellalee, Haider & Alali, Walid Y., 2022. "A Welfare and Pass-Through Effects of Regulations within Imperfect Competition," MPRA Paper 116512, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Zhu Wang & Julian Wright, 2017. "Ad valorem platform fees, indirect taxes, and efficient price discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(2), pages 467-484, May.
    3. de Rus, Ginés & Socorro, M. Pilar, 2022. "Subsidies in air transport markets: The economic consequences of choosing the wrong mechanism," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    4. Burra, Lavan T. & Sommer, Stephan & Vance, Colin, 2024. "Free-ridership in subsidies for company- and private electric vehicles," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    5. Gu, Dingwei & Huang, Yangguang, 2024. "Agency model versus wholesale model," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    6. Adachi, Takanori & Fabinger, Michal, 2022. "Pass-through, welfare, and incidence under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    7. Isaksen, Elisabeth T. & Johansen, Bjørn G., 2025. "Congestion pricing with electric vehicle exemptions: Car-ownership effects and other behavioral adjustments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    8. Helmuts Azacis & David R Collie, 2018. "Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 173-188, October.
    9. Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre & Kreider, Brent, 2001. "The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 231-251, August.
    10. Takanori Adachi & Michal Fabinger, 2017. "Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through, Incidence, and the Welfare Burden of Taxation in Oligopoly," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1040, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    11. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and public finance," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-6.
    12. Wu, Fulan & Li, Pei & Dong, Xuebing & Lu, Yuanzhu, 2022. "Exploring the effectiveness of China's dual credit policy in a differentiated automobile market when some consumers are environmentally aware," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    13. repec:osf:socarx:7tvgy_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Gaudin, Germain & White, Alexander, 2014. "On the antitrust economics of the electronic books industry," DICE Discussion Papers 147 [rev.], Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    15. Takanori Adachi & Michal Fabinger, 2017. "Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through and Welfare Measures under Imperfect Competition," Papers 1702.04967, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2018.
    16. Magnus Hoffmann & Marco Runkel, 2012. "Why Countries Compete in Ad Valorem Instead of Unit Capital Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 3893, CESifo.
    17. Kenneth T. Gillingham & Marten Ovaere & Stephanie M. Weber, 2025. "Carbon Policy and the Emissions Implications of Electric Vehicles," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 313-352.
    18. Laszlo Goerke, 2011. "Commodity tax structure under uncertainty in a perfectly competitive market," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(3), pages 203-219, July.
    19. Blackorby, Charles & Murty, Sushama, 2007. "Unit versus ad valorem taxes: Monopoly in general equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 817-822, April.
    20. Kojun Hamada & Takao Ohkawa & Makoto Okamura, 2022. "Optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly: The average cost function approach," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 1166-1192, May.
    21. Littlejohn, Christina & Proost, Stef, 2022. "What role for electric vehicles in the decarbonization of the car transport sector in Europe?," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:132:y:2022:i:646:p:2173-2206.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.