Antitrust Policy and Mergers: The Wealth Effect of Supreme Court Decisions
Many believe that antitrust policy has had a dramatic impact on merger strategies in the United States. For this to be true, enforcement of antitrust laws must affect a wide range of firms, not just those firms whose mergers are contested. This study tests whether or not firms engaged in uncontested mergers are affected by antitrust enforcement, as signaled by Supreme Court decisions. Using event study methodology, the authors find that antitrust policy against mergers was binding during the 1960s and 1970s as it lowered the value of targets in uncontested ongoing mergers. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 31 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:31:y:1993:i:4:p:517-33. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.