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Antitrust deregulation and the U.S. listing gap

Author

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  • Loveland, Robert
  • Okoeguale, Kevin

Abstract

Following recent empirical evidence that industry concentration in the U.S. in recent decades is substantially explained by the weakened enforcement of antitrust laws, we examine the effects of lax antitrust enforcement on the U.S. listing gap. We construct a counterfactual scenario that simulates listing counts as if antitrust deregulation had not occurred. We find that the magnitude of the listing gap from 2002 on is considerably attenuated. We estimate that antitrust deregulation explains an average of 27 % of the annual missing listings from 2003 to 2013, or 1,265 missing listing firms per year.

Suggested Citation

  • Loveland, Robert & Okoeguale, Kevin, 2025. "Antitrust deregulation and the U.S. listing gap," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:80:y:2025:i:c:s1544612325006853
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2025.107425
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stock market listing; Political economy; Deregulation; Mergers and acquisitions; Delists;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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