Can Competition Tame the Leviathan? Evidence from California's Proposition 39
In 2000, Californians voted on Proposition 39, a statewide ballot initiative that called for reducing the supermajority vote requirement on local school bond measures from two–thirds to 55 percent. This paper develops a model of voting behavior on that initiative. Our model predicts that support for lowering the supermajority vote requirement should increase as the degree of competition among school districts increases. Our analysis of vote returns from Proposition 39 supports this hypothesis. All else equal, moving from an area with little or no competition to an area with significant competition leads to a 13 percentage point increase in support for Proposition 39.
Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Ed Balsdon & Eric Brunner & Kim Rueben, 2003.
"Private Demands for Public Capital: Evidence from School Bond Referenda,"
0009, San Diego State University, Department of Economics.
- Balsdon, Ed & Brunner, Eric J. & Rueben, Kim, 2003. "Private demands for public capital: evidence from school bond referenda," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 610-638, November.
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