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Clarifying Confusion About the Balanced Budget Amendment

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  • Buchanan, James M.

Abstract

Examines structural flaws in U.S. fiscal politics as reflected in current budget deficits. Argues for the adoption of constitutional constraints that will change basic rules of the fiscal body politic.

Suggested Citation

  • Buchanan, James M., 1995. "Clarifying Confusion About the Balanced Budget Amendment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 48(3), pages 347-355, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:48:y:1995:i:3:p:347-55
    DOI: 10.1086/NTJ41789152
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan, James M, 1985. "The Moral Dimension of Debt Financing," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(1), pages 1-6, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Susanne Lohmann & Deborah M. Weiss, 2002. "Hidden Taxes and Representative Government: The Political Economy of the Ramsey Rule," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(6), pages 579-611, November.
    2. Asatryan, Zareh & Castellón, César & Stratmann, Thomas, 2018. "Balanced budget rules and fiscal outcomes: Evidence from historical constitutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 105-119.
    3. Goode, Richard, 1997. "The National Tax Journal in 1948-50 and 1994-96," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 50(4), pages 707-18, December.
    4. Javier Salinas, 1998. "The Constitutional Political Economy of Public Deficits: The Spanish Case 1," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 235-249, September.
    5. Marco Battaglini, 2009. "On the Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution," 2009 Meeting Papers 131, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Francesco Forte, 1999. "The Italian Post War Fiscal Constitution: Reasons of a Failure," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 103-117, March.
    7. Azzimonti, Marina & Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2016. "The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 45-61.
    8. Francesco Forte & Cosimo Magazzino, 2013. "Twin Deficits in the European Countries," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 19(3), pages 289-310, August.
    9. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December.
    10. Goode, Richard, 1997. "The National Tax Journal in 1948-50 and 1994-96," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 50(4), pages 707-718, December.

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