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Generalized Impulse Balance: An Experimental Test for a Class of 3 × 3 Games


  • Chmura, Thorsten
  • Goerg, Sebastian J.
  • Selten, Reinhard


In this paper, we introduce a generalized version of impulse balance equilibrium. The stationary concept is applied to 3 × 3 games based on the Bailiff and Poacher Game (Selten, 1991) and its predictive success is experimentally tested against the one of Nash equilibrium. Experiments with 26 different games were conducted; 12 games with completely mixed Nash equilibria and 14 games with partially mixed Nash equilibria. In all the games, generalized impulse balance yields predictions that are closer to the data than the ones of Nash equilibrium. Overall, generalized impulse balance has a significantly higher predictive success than Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Chmura, Thorsten & Goerg, Sebastian J. & Selten, Reinhard, 2014. "Generalized Impulse Balance: An Experimental Test for a Class of 3 × 3 Games," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(1-2), pages 27-53, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlrbe:105.00000002
    DOI: 10.1561/105.00000002

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    Cited by:

    1. Juan Camilo Cárdenas & César Mantilla & Rajiv Sethi, 2015. "Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-19, August.
    2. Erhao Xie, 2019. "Monetary Payoff and Utility Function in Adaptive Learning Models," Staff Working Papers 19-50, Bank of Canada.
    3. Sebastian J. Goerg & Tibor Neugebauer & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2016. "Impulse Response Dynamics in Weakest Link Games," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 284-297, August.
    4. Berger, Ulrich & De Silva, Hannelore & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, 2016. "Cognitive hierarchies in the minimizer game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 337-348.
    5. Irenaeus Wolff, 2023. "Heuristic Centered-Belief Players," TWI Research Paper Series 128, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    6. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova & Lian Xue, 2019. "Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 903-922, October.

    More about this item


    Impulse balance; Nash equilibrium; 3 x 3 games; Stationary concepts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior


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