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Book Review

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  • Ernst Maug

Abstract

Review of: Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. By Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried. 2004. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, and London

Suggested Citation

  • Ernst Maug, 2006. "Book Review," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 721-724, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_721:br_2.0.tx_2-a
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
    2. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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