Board Structure and Corporate Performance
This paper attempts to analyze the impact of board structure attributes on their accounting and stock market performance. Our analyses are built on an emerging market, Turkey for the period between 1995 and 2006. We conduct our analyses through binary logistic methodology. Our findings show that, while board ownership does not have any impact on the accounting performance, it has a fairly positive influence on the stock market performance of firms during the crisis period. Similarly, the situation when the CEO of a firm is also the chairman of the board is not found to have any impact on the corporate performance of firms, although its negative impact is present during the crisis period. Moreover, board independence is found to not to have an effect on accounting performance, yet the stock market perceives board independence positively, both in general and in the crisis periods. Finally, board size has a positive impact , both on the accounting and on the stock market performance of firms, yet the impact on the corporate performance reverts to adverse during the crisis period.
Volume (Year): 8 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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