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Governing their commons: Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and the Bloomington School

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  • Roberta Herzberg

Abstract

Elinor (Lin) and Vincent Ostrom spent their lives creating a school of institutional analysis that focused on the power of human creativity to solve collective human dilemmas. The Ostroms used the abstract methods and language of public choice theory, but their appreciation of human capability and self-governing kept them solidly grounded in real world decision-making. This belief led to their rich analytic approach to understanding human institutional design, which combined theoretical analysis, laboratory experiments, and empirical fieldwork. This essay identifies the major themes that formed the Bloomington School—the importance of constitutional design and self-governance, federalism and polycentric orders, the challenge of institutional design to solve social dilemmas, the importance of using multiple approaches (analytic, laboratory experiments, and careful field work) to understand important social problems., and a personal examination of the Ostrom’s lasting impact for public choice and public policy. Lin’s and Vincent’s lives and their academic careers came together to create their significant contributions. Observing how they collaborated and inspired students and colleagues provides a model for generations of scholars. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Roberta Herzberg, 2015. "Governing their commons: Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and the Bloomington School," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 95-109, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:163:y:2015:i:1:p:95-109
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0243-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Crawford, Sue E. S. & Ostrom, Elinor, 1995. "A Grammar of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 582-600, September.
    2. Ostrom, Vincent & Tiebout, Charles M. & Warren, Robert, 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 831-842, December.
    3. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    4. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    5. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, January.
    2. Li Zongcheng & Li Dejia, 2019. "Framework of Citizen-Autonomous Alliance for Elimination of Power Alienation: Rebuilt of Management (II) for New Civilization," Paradigm, , vol. 23(2), pages 219-237, December.
    3. Lin, Wanlin & Wang, Peng & Yuan, Minjun, 2023. "Governing the knowledge commons: Hybrid relational–contractual governance in china’s mining industry," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).

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