Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums
Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005 ; Levitt and Syverson 2005 ) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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- Lynn Fisher & Abdullah Yavas, 2010. "A Case for Percentage Commission Contracts: The Impact of a “Race” Among Agents," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 1-13, January.
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