Shadow-Pricing Interpretation of the Pigovian Rule for the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Note
The Pigovian rule for the optimal public goods provision with distortionary taxation is given a new interpretation. It relates the Pigovian rule to project evaluation rules in terms of shadow prices. Our formula for the Pigovian rule is compared with that given by existing literature for cases in which commodity taxes are set optimally to articulate the implications of their results. This approach also renders a clear insight on the nature of resource allocation and income redistribution effect involved in the public goods provision in a heterogeneous-consumers economy. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- King, Mervyn A., 1986. "A pigovian rule for the optimum provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-291, August.
- Besley, Timothy & Jewitt, Ian, 1991. "Decentralizing Public Good Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1769-78, November.
- Atsushi Tsuneki, 1989. "The Measurement of the Benefits of Public Inputs with Distortionary Taxation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 885-91, November.
- P. A. Diamond, 1975.
"A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule,"
146, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- A. B. Atkinson & N. H. Stern, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 119-128.
- Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton, 1990.
"Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods,"
NBER Working Papers
3506, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton, 1992. "Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 117-131, Summer.
- Tsuneki, Atsushi, 1993.
"Project Evaluation Rules for the Provision of Public Goods Reconsidered,"
Public Finance = Finances publiques,
, vol. 48(2), pages 268-87.
- Tsuneki, A., 1992. "Project Evaluation Rules for the Provision of Public Goods Reconsidered," ISER Discussion Paper 0262, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Diewert, W. E., 1983. "Cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation : A comparison of alternative approaches," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 265-302, December.
- Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. " Distributional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but not Program Choice or Design," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(2), pages 264-84.
- Sandmo, Agnar, 1998. "Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 365-382, December.
- Wildasin, David E, 1984. "On Public Good Provision with Distortionary Taxation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(2), pages 227-43, April.
- Dreze, Jean & Stern, Nicholas, 1987. "The theory of cost-benefit analysis," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 14, pages 909-989 Elsevier.
- Konishi, Hideo, 1995. "A Pareto-improving commodity tax reform under a smooth nonlinear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 413-446, March.
- Batina, Raymond G., 1990. "On the interpretation of the modified samuelson rule for public goods in static models with heterogeneity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-133, June.
- Hammond, Peter J., 1986. "Project evaluation by potential tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-36, June.
- Weymark, John A., 1979. "A reconciliation of recent results in optimal taxation theory," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 171-189, October.
- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991.
"Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation,"
828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 463-78, August.
- Wildasin, David E., 1979. "Public good provision with optimal and non-optimal commodity taxation : The single-consumer case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 59-64.
- Vidar Christiansen, 1981. "Evaluation of Public Projects under Optimal Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 447-457.
- Lau, Lawrence J & Sheshinski, Eytan & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1978. "Efficiency in the Optimum Supply of Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 269-84, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:9:y:2002:i:1:p:93-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.