Tax evasion as ade facto vote of disapproval of PAC contributions
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- Mukhtar Ali & H. Cecil & James Knoblett, 2001. "The effects of tax rates and enforcement policies on taxpayer compliance: A study of self-employed taxpayers," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(2), pages 186-202, June.
- Alm, James & Jackson, Betty & McKee, Michael, 1992. "Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1018-1026, September.
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- Richard Cebula, 2005. "Strong Presidential Approval or Disapproval Influencing the Expected Benefits of Voting and the Voter Participation Rate," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 33(2), pages 159-167, June.
- Richard Cebula & Daniel Hulse, 2007. "The Poll Results Hypothesis," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(1), pages 33-41, March.
- Richard J. Cebula & Gordon Tullock, 2006. "An Extension of the Rational Voter Model," Chapters,in: The Elgar Companion to Public Economics, chapter 15 Edward Elgar Publishing.
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