IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/jmi/articl/jmi-v3i1a4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Haris Aziz

    (Data61, CSIRO and UNSW Sydney, Australia)

Abstract

We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a core-stable allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Haris Aziz, 2018. "Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 3(1), pages 97-110, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v3i1a4
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2018.12.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v003-1/p_04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22574/jmid.2018.12.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jaramillo, Paula & Manjunath, Vikram, 2012. "The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1913-1946.
    2. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2004. "Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 257-279, January.
    3. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    4. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku, 2010. "House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 425-445, July.
    5. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
    6. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
    2. Patrick Harless & William Phan, 2020. "On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley–Scarf model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(2), pages 411-435, September.
    3. Karakaya, Mehmet & Klaus, Bettina & Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2019. "Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    4. Nicolò, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2017. "Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 508-524.
    5. Jaramillo, Paula & Manjunath, Vikram, 2012. "The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1913-1946.
    6. Raghavan, Madhav, 2020. "Influence in private-goods allocation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 14-28.
    7. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2019. "Matching with restricted trade," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 957-977, September.
    8. Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2020. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15377, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Ekici, Özgün, 2020. "Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 53-65.
    10. Ehlers, Lars, 2014. "Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 64-87.
    11. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    12. Emilio Guaman & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2023. "Coalitional Stability and Incentives in Housing Markets with Incomplete Preferences," Working Papers wp547, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    13. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 581-604, December.
    14. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2016. "Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 916, Boston College Department of Economics.
    15. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Ryan Tierney, 2022. "Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(4), pages 3110-3128, November.
    16. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena, 2011. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-16, September.
    17. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
    18. Bettina Klaus & David F. Manlove & Francesca Rossi, 2014. "Matching under Preferences," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    19. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Lars-Gunnar SVENSSON, 2014. "Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach," Cahiers de recherche 09-2014, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    20. Andersson, Tommy & Csehz, Ágnes & Ehlers, Lars & Erlanson, Albin, 2018. "Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets," Working Papers 2018:19, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 08 Mar 2019.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    House allocation; core; dichotomous preferences.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v3i1a4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Schweinzer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deyoruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.