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La Conducción de la Política Monetaria

  • Robert Rennhack
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    File URL: http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/083renna.pdf
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    Article provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía.

    Volume (Year): 28 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 83 ()
    Pages: 11-20

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    Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:28:y:1991:i:83:p:11-20
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    1. Dale W. Henderson, 1979. "Financial policies in open economies," International Finance Discussion Papers 133, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Blinder, Alan S, 1981. "Monetary Accommodation of Supply Shocks under Rational Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(4), pages 425-38, November.
    3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Tobin, James, 1983. "Monetary Policy: Rules, Targets, and Shocks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(4), pages 506-18, November.
    5. McCallum, Bennett T., 1981. "Price level determinacy with an interest rate policy rule and rational expectations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 319-329.
    6. Poole, William, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216, May.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    8. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1981. "The information content of the interest rate and optimal monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 192, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. D. Backus & J. Driffil, 1998. "Inflation and Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625, David K. Levine.
    10. Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1986. "Supply Shocks and Optimal Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Fischer, Stanley, 1985. "Supply Shocks, Wage Stickiness, and Accommodation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 1-15, February.
    12. Joshua Aizenman & Jacob A. Frenkel, 1985. "Supply Shocks, Wage Indexation and Monetary Accommodation," NBER Working Papers 1609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Barro, Robert J, 1986. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(380a), pages 23-37, Supplemen.
    14. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
    15. Stanley Fischer, 1988. "Rules Versus Discretion in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 2518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
    17. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
    18. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
    19. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
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