Peak-Hour Pricing Under Negative Externality: Impact of Customer Flexibility and Competitive Asymmetry

Several industries that provide services to customers (e.g., public utility and transportation) charge higher prices during peak hours to smooth demand. With technologies (e.g., electronic shelf labels) enabling retailers to change prices easily within each day, should supermarkets use peak-hour pricing? To examine this question formally, we introduce a stylized duopoly model in the presence of “negative externality,” where firms compete for congestion-averse customers. We characterize how customers endogenously segment themselves regarding when and where to shop, and then use the equilibrium outcomes to examine whether the firms should implement peak-hour pricing for varying types of customer flexibility and competitive asymmetry. Our analysis shows that, if customers are not flexible in their store choice, then both firms would always use peak-hour pricing. However, if store choice flexibility is present, then firms’ decisions depend on the competitive asymmetry as follows. If one firm has a clear competitive advantage (in terms of value or price) over the other firm, then the dominant firm will use peak-hour pricing, whereas the other firm will not. Otherwise, both firms will use peak-hour pricing if they engage in symmetric competition (in terms of similar value and price), or neither firm will use it if they engage in differentiated competition (high value versus low cost). Through our analysis of different extensions, we find that a firm’s ability to set its regular price would dampen the effect of peak-period pricing. Also, we obtain consistent results when there is heterogeneity in customer valuation and customer congestion aversion level.