Bankruptcy, Warranties and the Firm's Capital Structure
This paper examines the role of capital structure as an instrument for shifting risk between real and financial markets. The author considers a firm whose contractual agreements involve both consumers and debtholders and shows that if consumers are risk averse, whereas equity and debtholders are risk neutral, the firm uses its capital structure to shift risk away from consumers. The optimal allocation of risk across real and financial markets leads the firm to be fully equity financed. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 33 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Appelbaum, Elie, 1993. "Government policy and the firm's capital structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1185-1196, August.
- Murthy, D. N. P. & Djamaludin, I., 2002. "New product warranty: A literature review," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 231-260, October.
- Elie Appelbaum, 2002. "Union Contracts and the Firm's Financial Structure," Working Papers 2002_12, York University, Department of Economics.