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Órganos institucionales, presupuestos y regulación fiscal a nivel multigubernamental

Author

Listed:
  • Miguel Ángel Asencio

    (Universidad Nacional del Litoral (Argentina))

  • Alejandro Asencio

    (Universidad Nacional del Litoral (Argentina))

  • Liliana Peralta

    (Universidad Nacional del Litoral (Argentina))

Abstract

En artículos anteriores nos hemos referido a la existencia y papel de mecanismos institucionales e instituciones-órgano que desempeñen papeles reguladores y racionalizadores en los procesos presupuestarios, por un lado, o en la coordinación fiscal de acciones de distintos niveles de gobierno,por el otro. Ambas instancias están interrelacionadas,pese a no ser equivalentes, del mismo modo en que no existe equivalencia con las instituciones órgano de tipo esencialmente “vigilador”, de monitoreo o auditoría, aunque son visibles diversos e inevitables puntos de correlación o de contacto. Aquí expandiremos el análisis de las instituciones intervinientes o que influyen en el ciclo o proceso presupuestario, considerando sin embargo,que su existencia puede ser imaginada en más de un nivel de gobierno, dado lo cual también pasan a entrecruzarse con la mejora del sistema de relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales en países de tipo federativo. / In previous articles we have referred to the existence and role of institutional mechanisms and institutions that play regulatory and rationalizing roles in the budgetary processes, on the one hand, or in the fiscal coordination of actions of different levels of government, on the other. Both instances are interrelated, in spite of not being equivalent, in the same way that there is no equivalence with organ institutions of essentially "vigilant" type, of monitoring or auditing, although several and inevitable points of correlation or contact are visible. Here we will expand the analysis of the intervening institutions or those that influence the budget cycle or process, considering, however, that their existence can be imagined in more than one level of government, given that they also happen to interbreed with the improvement of the system of relations intergovernmental prosecutors in federative countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Ángel Asencio & Alejandro Asencio & Liliana Peralta, 2013. "Órganos institucionales, presupuestos y regulación fiscal a nivel multigubernamental," Revista Actualidad Económica, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 23(81), pages 5-9, Sept-Dic.
  • Handle: RePEc:ief:revaec:v:23:y:2013:i:81:p:5-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Charles Wyplosz, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191(1), pages 64-78, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procesos presupuestarios; coordinación fiscal; instituciones fiscales;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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