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Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Béal

    () (CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté, 30, Avenue de l’Observatoire, 25009 Besançon, France)

  • Subhadip Chakrabarti

    (School of Management and Economics, Queen’s University Belfast, 25, University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland, UK)

  • Amandine Ghintran

    (Keleti Faculty of Economics, Obuda University, Tavaszmezo 15-17, H-1084 Budapest, Hungary)

  • Philippe Solal

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Université de Saint-Etienne, 6, rue basse des rives, 42023 Saint-Etienne, France)

Abstract

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Béal & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Amandine Ghintran & Philippe Solal, 2010. "Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(3), pages 1-19, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:338-356:d:9657
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    partial cooperative equilibrium; supermodular games; network formation;

    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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