Optimal nonlinear income taxation with costly tax avoidance
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel R. Carroll, 2013. "The demand for income tax progressivity in the growth model," Working Paper 1106, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Landier, Augustin & Plantin, Guillaume, 2011.
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- Landier, Augustin & Plantin, Guillaume, 2011. "Inequality, tax avoidance and financial instability," IDEI Working Papers 701, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Landier, Augustin & Plantin, Guillaume, 2011. "Inequality, tax avoidance and financial instability," TSE Working Papers 11-282, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Casamatta, Georges, 2011. "Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance," CEPR Discussion Papers 8608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Huang, Jason & Rios, Juan, 2016. "Optimal tax mix with income tax non-compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 52-63.
- Augustin Landier & Guillaume Plantin, 2016. "Taxing the Rich," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6poqlonjhj8, Sciences Po.
- Augustin Landier & Guillaume Plantin, 2017. "Taxing the Rich," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 1186-1209.
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