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Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni?s Quest for Contractual Settlements

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Listed:
  • Nicola Giocoli

Abstract

The paper explores Maffeo Pantaleoni?s 1898 essay, focusing on his analysis of why rational agents enter mutualistic agreements, i.e. contracts, despite common predatory and parasitic behaviors. Pantaleoni classifies social relationships into predatory, parasitic, and mutualistic categories, anticipating the zero-sum logic where wealth is redistributed rather than created. The paper highlights the limitations of Pantaleoni?s neglect of the legal system in shaping contracts, contrasting his ideas with legal realism, which emphasizes law?s role in reducing transaction costs. It also connects Pantaleoni?s work with John Rogers Commons?s theory, extending his ideas into modern institutional economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Giocoli, 2025. "Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni?s Quest for Contractual Settlements," HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2025(1), pages 59-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:spespe:v:html10.3280/spe2025-001004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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