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Acquistare innovazione in sanit?: condividere responsabilit? e ruoli. Il caso degli acquisti dei servizi di diagnostica tumorale attraverso il Value-Based Procurement (VBP)

Author

Listed:
  • Fabio Amatucci
  • Manuela Brusoni

Abstract

Nei processi di acquisto di beni e servizi in sanit? si ? di recente affermato un approccio innovativo, denominato Value-Based Procurement (VBP), che rappresenta un cambiamento dal tradizionale modello di risparmio sui costi a breve termine verso un approccio pi? completo, in cui le prestazioni del sistema sanitario, i risultati per il paziente, nonch? l?efficienza e l?efficacia a lungo termine delle decisioni sono elementi fondamentali. Nel presente articolo, viene applicato questo modello all?acquisto del servizio di diagnosi per tumore, per il quale si sta affermando l?utilizzo del ?modello mutazionale?, caratterizzato dall?utilizzo di test diagnostici per la ricerca non tanto della sede tumorale, quanto della tipologia di mutazione genetica. Finalit? del lavoro ? la costruzione di un modello di acquisto basato sul valore, definendo obiettivi da perseguire, indicatori chiave per valutare gli effetti dell?innovazione, modalit? di misurazione del valore generato per i diversi attori in gioco (sistema sanitario; pazienti; fornitori), in un contesto di particolare complessit? scientifica, organizzativa e di impatto economico e sanitario.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Amatucci & Manuela Brusoni, 2023. "Acquistare innovazione in sanit?: condividere responsabilit? e ruoli. Il caso degli acquisti dei servizi di diagnostica tumorale attraverso il Value-Based Procurement (VBP)," MECOSAN, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2023(126), pages 71-93.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:mesame:v:html10.3280/mesa2023-126oa17287
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    References listed on IDEAS

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