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Determinants of Shopping Mall Attractiveness: the Case of Shopping Malls in Nairobi, Kenya

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  • Peter N. Kiriri

    (Department of Marketing, United States international University - Africa)

Abstract

In the recent past there has been massive growth of shopping malls in Africa. As a result, in some countries like Kenya, shopping malls have to fight to ensure they attract shoppers to the mall and as a result maintain the image and the current tenants while attracting new quality tenants. This study focused on identifying and validating a tool to measure the determinants of shopping mall attractiveness. Data was collected from residents of Nairobi City in Kenya. A total of 303 respondents participated in the study. Initially a tool with 38 items was developed from the literature and after subjecting it to a factor analysis, validity and reliability tests a 17 item scale was achieved. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modelling (SEM) were used in the determination of shopping mall attractiveness dimensions. From the analysis of data, five key determinants of shopping mall attractiveness were identified. These included: design and aesthetics; service options; convenience and safety; service employees; and, utilitarian value. Amongst the five dimensions, convenience and safety was identified as the most important in influencing shopping mall attractiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter N. Kiriri, 2021. "Determinants of Shopping Mall Attractiveness: the Case of Shopping Malls in Nairobi, Kenya," European Journal of Economics and Business Studies Articles, Revistia Research and Publishing, vol. 7, ejes_v7_i.
    • Handle: RePEc:eur:ejesjr:316
    DOI: 10.26417/ejes.v5i1.p258-270
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
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