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Two Variations on a Theme: Different Logics of Implementation Management in the EU and the ILO

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  • Hartlapp, Miriam

Abstract

From the perspective of the concept of legalization, the European Union (EU) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) both have a high degree of implementation powers delegated to them by the Member States. Beyond this categorization there are substantial differences in how they use the powers delegated to them. To capture these differences this article analyses the different EU and ILO implementation policies along the lines of three logics of implementation (enforcement, management and persuasion). It provides new empirical data on the instruments and mechanisms used to change Member State behaviour. The relative importance of the three logics within the organization, as well as the absolute strength determined by formal and actual power, are assessed. I argue that within the EU implementation-policy enforcement is most developed, whereas the logic most widely employed in the ILO is management. The analysis shows that it is beneficial to go beyond the broad categorizations of 'high delegation' within the legalization concept in order to move towards an understanding of the success or failure of different implementation policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartlapp, Miriam, 2005. "Two Variations on a Theme: Different Logics of Implementation Management in the EU and the ILO," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 9, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0133
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    References listed on IDEAS

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