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The 5G spectrum auction in Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Escobar, Juan
  • Epstein, Rafael
  • Correa, Jose
  • Gidi, Pamela
  • Markovits, Jozsef
  • Epstein, Natalie
  • Montenegro, Yerko
  • Turkieltaub, Abner

Abstract

In 2021, the Chilean government implemented a first-price package auction to allocate electromagnetic spectrum for 5G mobile services. The auction was run sequentially for different spectrum bands, allowing firms to exploit band complementarities. It was a combinatorial auction, so firms could bid for any combination of blocks within a band. It contemplated spectrum caps – upper limits on the spectrum for each firm – to ensure competitiveness. The beauty contests used in previous processes became obsolete, as there was a need to promote competitiveness and transparency in the telecommunication sector. Four incumbents and one potential entrant participated in the auction. The auction raised more than USD $450 million, which was six times more than the sum of the revenues of all previous contests in the country. We discuss this experience and show how different aspects of the context justified our design choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Escobar, Juan & Epstein, Rafael & Correa, Jose & Gidi, Pamela & Markovits, Jozsef & Epstein, Natalie & Montenegro, Yerko & Turkieltaub, Abner, 2023. "The 5G spectrum auction in Chile," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(7).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:47:y:2023:i:7:s0308596123000915
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2023.102580
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Spectrum auctions; 5G;

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