Agency and incentives in the NHS internal market
This paper presents and assesses the structure of incentives created by the 1991 reforms to the U.K. National Health System. It argues that these reforms created a set of overlapping principal-agent relationships, in which the ownership of assets and the division of rewards from use of these assets is unclear. This lack of clarity and the form of performance monitoring used by the government as principal in these agency relationships seem likely to give limited incentives for improvements in efficiency in the medium term. The paper discusses possible means to improve incentives.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 40 (1995)
Issue (Month): 12 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/315/description#description|
|Order Information:|| Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional|