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Do direct awards lead to better public transport?

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  • Schaaffkamp, Christoph

Abstract

The best public transport with regard to patronage numbers operates in Switzerland, with a demand that is much higher in Swiss than in comparable European cities. Further analysis reveals that, although the overall level of financial support for the public transport is very high in Switzerland, subsidies per passenger are comparatively low. It is a similar story in cities in England with very successful bus operators. Public transport in Switzerland is a public service provided mostly by companies in public ownership. Due to the lack of competitive pressure one would expect a rather moderate focus on passengers and innovations, if any at all, as well as lower levels of efficiency. The opposite is true.

Suggested Citation

  • Schaaffkamp, Christoph, 2018. "Do direct awards lead to better public transport?," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 218-226.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:69:y:2018:i:c:p:218-226
    DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2018.04.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schaaffkamp, Christoph, 2014. "How can customer focus be strengthened in competitive tendering?," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 305-314.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State ownership; Public transport; Direct award; Switzerland; Competitive tendering;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
    • R40 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - General
    • R49 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Other

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