Tax evasion and the allocation of capital
The efficiency cost of capital misallocations between the corporate sector and the noncorporate sector is typically measured using statutory tax differences. Corporate-source income tax compliance is high because of third party reporting, however, while noncorporate rental income tax compliance is low. Differential evasion thus exacerbates statutory differences and enlarges the efficiency cost. To measure this effect, we build a numerical general equilibrium model where households simultaneously choose portfolios of risky assets and fractions of income to report.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, 1988.
"Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital,"
NBER Chapters,in: Tax Policy and the Economy: Volume 2, pages 63-88
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, 1987. "Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital," NBER Working Papers 2430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Klepper, Steven & Nagin, Daniel, 1989. "The Anatomy of Tax Evasion," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, Spring.
- Joel B. Slemrod, 1983. "A General Equilibrium Model of Taxation with Endogenous Financial Behavior," NBER Chapters,in: Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis, pages 427-458 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joel Slemrod, 1981. "A General Equilibrium Model of Taxation with Endogenous Financial Behavior," NBER Working Papers 0799, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1987. " The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(2), pages 183-192.
- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1985. "The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency," NBER Working Papers 1759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yaniv, Gideon, 1990. "Tax evasion under differential taxation : The economics of income source misreporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 327-337, December.
- Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton, 1983. "The Taxation of Income from Capital: A Comparative Study of the U.S., U.K., Sweden, and West Germany--The Theoretical Framework--," NBER Working Papers 1058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joel Slemrod, 1982. "Tax Effects on the Allocation of Capital Among Sectors and Among Individuals: A Portfolio Approach," NBER Working Papers 0951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Landskroner, Yoram & Muller, Eitan & Swary, Itzhak, 1991. "Tax evasion and financial equilibrium," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 25-35, February.
- Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
- Fullerton, Don & Mackie, James B. III, 1989. "Economic Efficiency in Recent Tax Reform History: Policy Reversals or Consistent Improvements?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 42(1), pages 1-13, March.
- Don Fullerton & James B. Mackie, 1988. "Economic Efficiency in Recent Tax Reform History: Policy Reversals or Consistent Improvements?," NBER Working Papers 2593, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.